This paper examines elements of British tax policy and discusses their implications for the US, where several recent proposals would mirror aspects of the British system. These include reducing filing requirements under the individual income tax, indexing capital gains for inflation, cutting mortgage interest deductions, enacting a value added tax, and integrating the corporate and personal income taxes. The paper also discusses implications of the poll tax for tax reform. Britain and America have made different choices involving equity, efficiency, simplicity and other goals. These choices offer the chance to help identify the impact of tax policy.
this purpose because the British tax system is fundamentally like the American system in many respects, but contains many features that relate directly to changes currently or recently proposed in the US.
The systems are most obviously similar in that they rely on income and payroll (social security) taxes for the bulk of their revenue. Both countries experiencedindeed, led -the drive in the 1980s to reduce tax rates and broaden tax bases that caught on around the world and was encapsulated in a series of changes made in the 1980s by Conservative governments in the UK and in the US Tax Reform Act of 1986.
But many features of the British system differ significantly from that of the US. For example, the personal income tax is based on individual rather than family income, and only about 10 per cent of taxpayers have been required to file returns in recent years. Capital gains are indexed for inflation, while deductions for mortgage interest and other items are much more limited than in the US. In general, relative to its American counterpart, the British income tax emphasises simplicity, downplays the role of social policy and limits attempts to obtain finelytuned measures of income. These differences date to the origins of the income tax in each country.
The British corporate income tax is partially integrated. Excise taxes and a value added tax raise a significant amount of revenue. The UK recently lived through an unsuccessful attempt to replace local government property taxes with poll taxes.
Analysis of each of these differences may contain important lessons for academics and policymakers alike. However, it should be clear at the outset that Britain has not found any way to 'solve' the various trade-offs between equity, efficiency, simplicity and other goals. Rather, the lessons stem from the fact that the UK has chosen different points (hopefully, but probably not) on the frontiers of these trade-offs. Thus the lessons to be drawn here are not in generating conclusions about what is right or wrong about tax policy, but in providing evidence on the costs and benefits of different policies and in locating the biggest gaps between 'textbook' analyses and the real world. Another set of issues involves assessing the political and other factors that have led to the differences in policy in the first place. (For one such discussion, see Keen (1997) .)
The next section provides a very brief overview of the current status and recent evolution of British taxes, along with some comparisons with the US. Sections III to VI discuss what I view as some of the major differences between the systems, as noted above.
The final section offers some concluding thoughts, but all of the issues discussed below leave plenty of scope for new cross-country and within-country analyses that could sharpen the conclusions. Such analyses -for example, of the impact of alternative forms of capital gains taxation on investment and entrepreneurship -need to consider the interaction of several tax policies as well as other existing regulations or economic conditions. Thus many of the conclusions are, of necessity, of a limited or tentative nature.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM
1 Total government tax revenues were 37.6 per cent of GDP in Britain in 1995, compared with 31.3 per cent in the US. This difference has fluctuated over time, and stood at 7.7 percentage points in 1970, 6.0 points in 1980 and 7.2 points in 1990. Table 1 describes the composition of tax revenues in Britain for 1993-94 and in the US for 1993. The taxes in the table are grouped by US convention. (British   TABLE 1 The Composition of Taxes in the UK and in the US UK, 1993-94 US tables typically classify capital gains as a separate tax from the individual income tax.) Both countries obtain the most revenue from their individual income tax and social insurance payroll taxes, though the US collects more from each than the UK does. The countries collect about the same proportion of their revenue from corporate income taxes, though the annual figures vary over time. Property taxes and estate and gift taxes account for a somewhat smaller share of revenues in the UK than in the US. The major difference shown in Table 1 is the importance of consumption taxes. VAT raises about one-sixth of all tax revenues in Britain, more than double the proportion of revenue raised by general sales taxes in the US. Taxes on specific consumption items also differ. Taxes on alcohol, tobacco and transportation fuel totalled 10.9 per cent of tax revenues in Britain compared with only 2.6 per cent in the US.
Given these differences, effective tax rates on different types of economic activity may be expected to vary in the two countries. Quick and Neubig (1994) present data on measures of average tax rates. They estimate that, in 1991, consumption tax revenues totalled about 19.4 per cent of aggregate consumption in the UK compared with 6.2 per cent in the US. Economy-wide average tax rates for payroll taxes and combined individual and corporate income taxes were similar in the two countries. The average total tax rate on labour income -including income, payroll and consumption taxes -was estimated to be 36.5 per cent in the UK, compared with 29.3 per cent in the US. While such information is instructive, data on effective marginal tax rates would be more useful in understanding the tax incentives faced by firms and households. However, obtaining systematic, comparable and current data is difficult.
There is a general sense in both Britain and the US that the British system, especially the income tax, has fewer deductions or loopholes. It would be interesting to quantify this difference, but it is quite difficult to do so. Table 2 reports estimates of the distribution of the burdens of taxation in the two countries. Most striking, the British tax system provides virtually no net redistribution of income on an annual basis. This is in part due to the presence of taxes that appear to be regressive with respect to annual income, such as VAT and excise taxes. In addition, substantial redistribution occurs through government spending in the UK. In the US, most redistribution occurs through the spending system, but the tax system also redistributes resources from higher-income to lower-income households. A series of Tax Acts has significantly altered the British tax system since the late 1970s. One major theme has been to reduce income tax and raise consumption taxes -VAT and excise taxes. The basic VAT rate was raised from 8 per cent to 15 per cent in 1979 and to 17.5 per cent in the early 1990s. Taxes on alcohol, tobacco and transportation fuel have also increased substantially. The reduction in income taxes has been tilted toward the high end of the income distribution, while the increase in consumption taxes has been borne by all income groups (Hills, 1988) .
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Within the income tax, rates have fallen dramatically. The top rate on wage income fell from 83 per cent in the late 1970s to 40 per cent by 1988. An additional surcharge of up to 15 per cent on investment income, which raised the top rate to 98 per cent, was eliminated. The 'basic' rate faced by most taxpayers fell from 33 per cent in tax year 1978-79 to 24 per cent by 1996-97, and is now 23 per cent.
The base changed in several ways. Deductions for mortgage interest have been curtailed. At the same time, however, thresholds for the income tax brackets have been raised substantially in real terms, the treatment of capital gains has been liberalised significantly and several new saving incentives have been introduced.
Income tax rates for large corporations fell from 52 per cent in 1980 to 33 per cent by 1996-97; tax rates on small corporations fell from 40 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent by 1996-97. At the same time, expensing of some types of corporate investment was swept away in 1984 and replaced with a significantly less generous set of depreciation schedules that helped equalise the present value of depreciation allowances across assets. The extent of integration between personal and corporate taxes has been reduced.
In the estate tax, the exemption has grown dramatically but remains lower than the US exemption. The large number of estate tax rates that applied earlier have been collapsed to a flat 40 per cent. National Insurance (social security) taxes have increased by several percentage points, the employer ceiling for contributions has been abolished and the base has broadened to cover some fringe benefits.
At the local level, in 1989, residential property taxes were replaced with a 'community charge', or poll tax, which was abandoned in two years and replaced with a new tax that is based on property value and number of adults living in a household.
The new Labour government elected in the Spring of 1997 has proposed additional changes that would further reduce corporate tax rates and the extent of integration between corporate and personal taxes, cut mortgage tax relief by onethird, provide targeted investment incentives and change other items. Other recent developments in British taxation look decidedly American. There has been recent speculation about adding additional tax brackets, moving to a two-tier capital gains tax -depending on how long the asset is held -and introducing tax incentives modelled after US Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and earned income tax credits. The new Labour government even has its own 'no new taxes' pledge -Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, promised in the campaign at one point not to raise income tax rates for five years and at another not to raise income tax rates on those with income below £40,000.
III. THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
The unit of taxation in the UK is the individual, although a system of joint filing was used before 1990. The tax base includes wages, interest, dividends, some capital gains, pension benefits, unemployment benefits, royalties, property income, business income and other items.
The personal allowance (the equivalent of a US exemption) was £3,765 in tax year 1996-97 (which ended in April 1997). 4 Married couples receive an additional allowance of £1,790 that can be allocated arbitrarily across spouses. Taxpayers who are blind, recent widows or elderly receive additional allowances. There are no child allowances, but there is a child benefit spending programme.
After subtracting the exemption and any allowances, the marginal tax rate in 1996-97 was 20 per cent on the first £3,900 of taxable income, 24 per cent -the 'basic rate' -on additional income up to £25,500 and 40 per cent on higher levels of income. The basic rate has since been reduced to 23 per cent. It is estimated that, in 1996-97, about 25 per cent of taxpayers faced the lower rate, 67 per cent faced the basic rate and the remaining 8 per cent faced the top rate as their marginal tax rate. Allowances and tax brackets are indexed for inflation.
Filing
From an American perspective, probably the most interesting aspect of the British income tax is that very few citizens actually have to file tax forms. Filing is usually unnecessary because the tax structure is sufficiently simple and because withholding regulations generate, in principle at least, exactly the right amount of withheld taxes at source on wages and other income.
The main instrument of exact withholding is the 'pay-as-you-earn' (PAYE) system. PAYE is a cumulative withholding scheme that applies to wage income. Workers provide their employers with certain basic information, including marital status and age, which is used to calculate withholding allowances. Employers then withhold taxes as directed by the PAYE formulas. The key to exact withholding is that the process is cumulative. At each pay cheque, the taxes withheld equal the difference between cumulative taxes owed (on cumulative earnings to date) and cumulative taxes paid until then. Thus employees who stop working in the middle of the year none the less have the correct amount withheld. When employees change jobs, information on their cumulative wages and taxes is provided to their new employers, and the calculations continue. In contrast, in the US, taxes on wages are withheld, but withholding is neither cumulative nor intended to be exact.
Withholding wages at source is a necessary but by no means sufficient method of ensuring that most people do not have to file tax returns. Coupled with PAYE, a number of features of the British tax system enhance the feasibility of a nonfiling system. First, exact withholding is facilitated by requiring that taxpayers file individual, rather than joint, returns and by setting the tax brackets so that a majority of taxpayers face the same marginal rate.
Second, taxes on capital income are structured in a way that reduces filing requirements. Taxes on interest are withheld at a 20 per cent rate. Personal-level taxes on dividends are in effect also withheld at a 20 per cent rate, as discussed in Section V. Capital gains on owner-occupied housing are completely exempt from taxes. On other assets, only inflation-adjusted capital gains in excess of £6,300 per person per year are subject to taxation. Indexing, however, cannot be used to turn a gain into a loss or to increase a loss. The effect is that very few households pay capital gains taxes. The first £3,250 of net rental income on rooms in the owner's home is exempted from taxation. Tax-preferred saving is incorporated via payroll deductions for pensions. Taxpayers may also contribute to saving incentive plans, but these contributions are limited and are 'back-loaded' -the contributions are not deductible but earnings and withdrawals are not taxed. Thus moving funds into and out of such accounts does not generate tax consequences.
Third, expenditures that would qualify as itemised deductions in the US receive much less generous treatment in the UK. Subsidies for mortgage interest are provided, but not through tax filing and not, in fact, in a way that is at all related to taxes. Limited interest relief is provided at source. In 1996-97, the subsidy was at a 15 per cent rate, regardless of the taxpayer's marginal rate. For example, a household with a 10 per cent mortgage would pay 8.5 per cent interest on the first £30,000 of the loan, while the lender would collect the remaining 1.5 per cent interest on that amount from the government. The full amount of interest on the remaining balance is charged to the household.
A limited amount of charitable contributions can be made through a payroll deduction plan, and taxpayers can also 'covenant' income -earmarking the income to charity for four years or more. The contribution generates a deduction at the basic rate of tax. The charity recovers this amount (the basic rate times the contribution) from the Inland Revenue (the British tax agency). Single contributions between £600 and £5 million may also be deducted.
Deductions for employee business expenses are generally very strict and allowed only for items that are 'wholly, exclusively and necessarily' related to business. Medical expense deductions have been extremely limited. (Of course, the structure of health expenditures is quite different in the UK from that in the US.) There are no general deductions for personal interest payments, casualty losses or local taxes.
Each of these features -individual filing, exact withholding of taxes on wages, a wide tax bracket applying to the basic rate, the treatment of capital income and the treatment of deductions -reduces the need for individuals to file tax forms in order to reconcile tax liability with taxes withheld. Despite all of these features, however, about 10 per cent or more of British taxpayers have to file tax returns in any given year. These are largely high-income taxpayers with asset income (taxes on which have been withheld at a lower rate), those with capital gains above the exempted amount and those with self-employment income.
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What can be learned from these policies? First, although filing requirements are clearly an administrative issue, they appear to have important effects on the structure of tax policy. The British income tax is marked by systematically different choices from its US counterpart. The system has fewer rates, fewer deductions and more withholding. There are (currently) no dependent allowances, earned income tax credits, alternative minimum taxes, income-based phase-out of allowances, income-based cap on deductions, child tax credits or education tax credits. In general, then, the British income tax features more compromises in favour of simplicity and in opposition to measuring income or ability to pay exactly. There are also fewer attempts to enact social policy through the tax code. This should not be read as British indifference to such social concerns; many such programmes are enacted through the spending side instead.
It seems plausible that at least some of these structural differences are due to differences in withholding patterns and the administrative features of the tax code.
In particular, once withholding and non-filing become important aspects of the tax code, many special tax subsidies and loopholes may become more difficult to design and enforce.
For example, there is a long tradition of withholding at source under the British income tax. In 1799, Pitt imposed a 10 per cent tax on all incomes above £200. The tax raised £5-7 million annually for three years, which was much less than had been predicted by the revenue estimators of the time. The revenue shortfall was due at least in part to 'gentle' administration of the tax law by local commissioners and to widespread evasion. In 1802, the tax was repealed, but in 1803 Addington restored the income tax (apparently under the name of a property tax) and included withholding at source. By 1806, the tax raised about £20 million, even though the tax rate was only half as large as that under Pitt's income tax. The income tax was repealed again in 1816, but since the tax was restored in 1842, withholding at source has remained a prominent feature (Sabine, 1980) . Exact withholding of wage income was established in the 1940s, when the financing requirements of the Second World War led to a 150 per cent increase in the number of taxpayers over a two-year period. The immediate goal of exact withholding was to reduce the number of mistakes and ease the computational burdens imposed on the large number of inexperienced taxpayers.
In contrast, the US income tax has always contained a variety of special deductions. Even the original 1913 version of the modern income tax included deductions for mortgage interest, state and local income and property taxes, casualty and theft losses, and life insurance investment income, and excluded interest income from state and local bonds. Deductions for employer-provided health care and charity, as well as special treatment of capital gains, were introduced within 10 years. Of the estimated $403 billion in tax expenditures in the 1993 US tax code, over two-thirds were due to provisions enacted before 1929 (General Accounting Office, 1994) . Although the US did initiate withholding in the 1940s when the income tax was expanded greatly to finance the war, withholding was never intended to be exact and households were still required to file returns. This not only made it possible to enact social policy through the tax code, but made the tax code a highly visible way to enact such programmes.
If non-filing is expected to generate large administrative and compliance savings, the British experience may be somewhat surprising. The total administrative and compliance costs of a tax system include those faced by individuals, firms and government. Since so few individual forms are filed in Britain, individuals' compliance costs seem much more likely to be higher in the US (see, for example, Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) ). But costs imposed on government and firms are likely to be higher in Britain. Kay and King (1990) cite Inland Revenue administrative costs of about 2 per cent of revenue collected. This is between three and four times the comparable figure for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relative to total US revenues. Comparable estimates of costs borne by firms in the two countries are difficult to obtain.
In any case, complaints about the complexity and administrability of the British tax system cannot be ignored. Kay and King (1990) argue forcefully that the compliance and administrative costs are significant. Recent events suggest that the British are moving toward a self-assessment system more like that of the US (Johnston, 1996) . The interaction of more self-employment, more contract work and problems with the exact withholding system has pushed the system in this direction. Up to one-third of British taxpayers are expected to be required to fill out forms in the near future. A new system of self-assessment -where taxpayers report all of their own income, claim deductions and calculate their own tax billapparently has broad support from both political parties, even amid criticisms that the forms appear to be quite complex.
Recently, Senator Dole and Representative Gephardt have independently proposed no-return systems for a substantial portion of US taxpayers. In 1994, about 40 per cent of taxpayers filed the simplified 1040A and 1040EZ forms, and about 78 per cent of all returns faced a marginal rate of 0 or 15 per cent. This suggests that a substantial portion of the population could be integrated into a noreturn system. But current US withholding formulas are not designed to be exact for any but the simplest situations, and so would need to be amended.
A tax agency reconciliation (TAR) system is an alternative approach to eliminating tax filing. In a TAR system, withholding is typically as close to exact as possible, but the tax agency calculates each household's tax at the end of the year and sends a bill or refund. 6 Gale and Holtzblatt (1997) estimate that, with minimal changes in the structure of tax policy, but with significant changes in tax administration, withholding at source could be established for wages, the earned income tax credit, interest, dividends, pensions, Individual Retirement Account distributions and unemployment insurance benefits. If so, then up to 56 million, or almost half of all, US taxpayers could be placed on a TAR system. These are households that have income only from the sources mentioned and do not claim itemised deductions.
The saving in compliance costs may not prove significant, however. Of the 56 million households, 44 million currently file the relatively simple 1040A and 1040EZ returns and probably spend very little time filling out forms to begin with. For example, Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) provide survey evidence that 30 per cent of households spent 0-5 hours complying with the income tax (including keeping records, learning about the tax rules, filling out the tax form and other items) and an additional 15 per cent spent less than 10 hours. Almost half made no financial expenditure on tax preparation and an additional 17 per cent paid less than $50.
Adding large numbers of additional taxpayers to a TAR system may prove more difficult, and at the very least would require changes either in the structure of policy and/or in how policies are administered. Even if taxpayers with the forms of income mentioned above and who had itemised deductions and capital gains were brought into the system, which would be difficult, only 6 million more taxpayers would be covered.
No-return systems raise several additional considerations. Many taxpayers may experience significant psychic or emotional costs when filing any income tax return. Thus, even if the vast majority of affected taxpayers already face relatively simple tax situations in an objective sense, a no-return system could still provide significant benefits to certain households. However, in the US, unless state income taxes were also shifted to a no-return system, the reduction in filing and psychic costs would be likely to be minimal. Notably, there are no local income taxes in the UK.
Second, US taxpayers clearly like receiving refunds, perhaps as a form of forced saving or for some other reason. A cumulative withholding system would be likely to eliminate refunds, but could in principle be designed to over-withhold systematically. In a TAR system, however, refunds could still be obtained.
Third, under either type of no-return system, citizens would be likely to want to examine the agency-provided forms carefully and would have to keep records to do so. It is unclear whether US taxpayers would be willing to trust the IRS to calculate their taxes for them. This might be compounded by the notion that a noreturn system is likely to leave people less aware of the tax system they face and hence of the tax consequence of their actions. Indeed, numerous commentators note what they view as the typical British citizen's ignorance of the tax system (see Kay and King (1990) , for example). In contrast, a recent proposal by Representative Armey would have done away with withholding and required people to file tax payments every month. The idea behind the proposal was to make people more aware of the tax system in general and the tax burdens they face.
Fourth, a TAR system would place much more stringent requirements on taxpayers to file forms with the IRS and on the IRS to process the forms promptly. Whether each of these tasks could be accomplished in a timely and accurate manner is unclear.
Marriage
An income tax can embody at most two of the following three principles: marginal tax rates should rise with income; families with equal income should pay equal taxes; and the tax system should be neutral with respect to marriage.
The British system, like the American, violates the third principle. But, whereas the American system contains a complicated pattern of marriage taxes and marriage subsidies, the British income tax contains only marriage subsidies. This is accomplished directly via individual filing and the additional allowance that married couples can allocate across their respective returns. An additional benefit to married couples stems from the ability, in an individual filing system, to allocate capital income to the family member with the lowest marginal tax rate. The British system violates the second principle as well. Individual filing with rising tax rates implies that, controlling for total income, married couples with unequal income will in general pay more tax than married couples whose income is distributed equally.
Housing
Since housing is both a consumption good and an investment good and generates income, it is potentially exposed to a wide variety of taxes. The treatment of housing under VAT and the property tax is discussed in Sections IV and VI.
Under the income tax, imputed rent from housing, net of interest and maintenance costs, was taxed in years prior to 1962. Imputed rental values were determined based on periodic government valuations of property. By 1962, however, the imputed rents were still at pre-war levels, and the government decided to abandon the tax on imputed rent rather than update the rental amounts.
The British system has never taxed capital gains on individuals' main residence, but some sort of mortgage interest relief has always been provided. When tax subsidies for most forms of borrowing were eliminated in 1974-75, subsidies for interest on the principal private residence were retained, subject to a loan limit of £25,000. No subsidies were provided for mortgages on second homes. The limit was raised to £30,000 in 1983-84 and has stayed fixed ever since. It now applies to the sum of loans against each property.
7 Tax relief in earlier years was provided at the taxpayer's marginal income tax rate. More recently, the subsidy has been provided only up to a fixed rate, which was set at 25 per cent, then reduced to 20 per cent and, in 1995, reduced to 15 per cent for new loans. The new Labour government has proposed cutting the rate to 10 per cent.
These policies raise several interesting issues. First, mortgage interest relief has been effectively divorced from the tax system. The statutory rate of subsidy and the loan limit are independent of marginal tax rates. Second, because £30,000 is well below the average new mortgage loan, mortgage subsidies provide almost no incentive at the margin for most taxpayers. Third, the decline in the value of mortgage interest subsidies has been gradual but gigantic. By 1996, the price level in Britain was 5.5 times its 1974 level. Over the same period, the loan amount that could be subsidised rose by 20 per cent (to £30,000), so that the real loan limit fell by 78 per cent. Over the same period, interest rates have also fallen dramatically, and, as noted above, the rate of subsidy is much lower currently than in the past. These factors have combined to reduce the subsidy to a tiny fraction of its former value. 8 It is very difficult, however, to find any trace of these changes in aggregate UK data. Home-ownership rates in the UK rose from 52.7 per cent in 1974 to 66.8 per cent in 1994. By comparison, US home-ownership rates were stagnant at about 64 per cent during this period. The ratio of mortgage debt to GDP also rose in the UK, from 25 per cent in 1974 to 56 per cent in 1994. This exceeds the increase in the US, where the ratio rose from 47 per cent to 64 per cent over the same period. Both mortgage debt as a percentage of the housing stock and the housing stock as a percentage of private fixed capital stock rose more in the UK than in the US over this period. These trends, of course, are due to many other factors besides the reduction in the value of the mortgage interest subsidies. For example, privatisation of public housing in the 1980s undoubtedly raised home-ownership rates in the UK, and liberalisation of financial markets accelerated the rise in mortgage debt (Attanasio and Banks, 1997) .
Subsidising mortgage interest at a fixed, low rate, rather than allowing mortgage interest deductions, could have significant appeal for the US. Suppose the deduction were converted to a credit at a 15 per cent rate, the lowest marginal tax rate. This would significantly reduce the cost of mortgage interest subsidies and reduce the overall level of subsidies to housing, which are quite generous in the US. It would also be a very progressive tax shift, as it would have minimal impact on the taxpayers in the 15 per cent marginal tax bracket and, if it were refundable, would assist those in the 0 per cent tax bracket. Estimates suggest that reducing the subsidies would be unlikely to hurt home-ownership rates significantly, if at all (Green and Reschovsky, 1997; Capozza, Green and Hendershott, 1996) .
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A major constraint on such proposals in the US is the alleged firestorm of protest that would occur were policymakers to touch such a sacred cow. In that light, it is interesting to note that the reduction in mortgage subsidies in Britain has been gradual and has been supported by ruling parties on the right and on the left.
Capital Gains
Capital gains taxes were introduced in the UK in 1965. Only real capital gains that have accrued since 1982 are taxable now, and the first £6,300 per person is exempt from taxation in each year. Real gains less the exempt amount are added to the individual's income and taxed at ordinary income tax rates.
10 Both indexing and the exemption level raise several interesting issues. Opponents of indexing in the US have argued that such a change would not be feasible. The British experience, at first glance at least, refutes that claim, but any refutation should be highly qualified. First, it is notable that indexing cannot be used to convert a gain into a loss, or to raise the value of a loss, and that interest payments are not tax-deductible at the personal level in Britain. Each of these features diminishes the opportunity to use indexing to engage in tax-sheltering activities, and none of them is commonly raised when indexing is proposed in the US. Second, indexing does not achieve the goal of taxing real income. For most taxpayers with capital gains in Britain, the gains are fully exempt from taxation either because of the large exemption level or because assets such as housing, which comprise a large portion of most households' wealth, are exempt from capital gains taxation. Third, it is unclear how well the system of capital gains taxes operates. Data on the evasion rates and compliance and administrative costs associated with indexing are difficult to obtain.
The large exemption is interesting in its own right. Suppose the US exempted the first $20,000 in capital gains for joint filers and the first $10,000 for all other filers. Calculations from the 1994 IRS public use file indicate that the exemption would reduce the number of taxpayers with taxable capital gains by 89 per cent, so that only about 1 per cent of taxpayers paid capital gains taxes, but would reduce taxable capital gains by only 29 per cent. Thus, in the absence of changes in realisation patterns, such an exemption would greatly reduce the number of taxpayers facing capital gains taxes but would reduce capital gains revenues by a smaller amount. These figures indicate the simplification potential of an exemption.
In practice, however, people would change their behavioural patterns to take advantage of the exemption. Formal evidence suggests that the elasticity of the timing of capital gains realisations with respect to taxes is quite high (Burman and Randolph, 1994) and casual evidence suggests that much activity of this sort occurs in Britain currently. Such behaviour would reduce both the number of people who had to pay capital gains taxes and the revenue yield. Indexing gains for inflation would reduce both items further.
The net result of the treatment of capital gains is that very few people pay capital gains tax in Britain, and the tax raises almost no revenue, accounting for only 0.4 per cent of all taxes and 1.6 per cent of taxes raised by the income tax plus the capital gains tax (see Table 1 ). In the US, in contrast, federal capital gains taxes alone account for about 2.5 per cent of all tax revenue and 7 per cent of federal income taxes (Burman and Ricoy, 1997) .
11 Thus capital gains tax revenues are roughly five to six times larger as a percentage of GDP in the US than in the UK.
It is unclear, however, which country treats capital gains more generously at the margin, for taxable investors. Indexing and preferential rates of taxation are alternative methods of reducing the tax rate on nominal gains. In principle, the relative generosity should vary by asset and time period. For example, since 1982, the S&P 500 has risen in the US by about 660 per cent, while the price level has increased by only 66 per cent. Hence, a 29 per cent exclusion, as has been provided in the US for high-income taxpayers in recent years, 12 would have been much more valuable at the margin than the British system of indexing combined with taxing real gains at the ordinary income rate. The latter would have provided an effective exclusion of about 10 per cent for nominal gains at the margin. Clearly, results for other assets and other time periods will vary.
While the notion that the income tax should tax real income is a sound one in principle, the British experience suggests that indexing of capital gains for inflation should be considered in the broader context that includes the tax rates on capital gains, the tax treatment of interest payments, the exemption level for capital gains and rules about when indexing may not be used. To a large extent, the British system of taxing capital gains appears to be an abolition of gains taxes for almost all households, plus positive taxation of large gains at the margin, in order to reduce large-scale tax arbitrage. The lack of visibility may be one reason why the taxation of capital gains barely appears on the radar screen of major issues in British tax policy, whereas capital gains taxes are hotly contested in the US.
Saving Incentives and Pensions
Personal saving rates for the US and UK have followed different trends. The US rate fell about 4 percentage points between the early 1980s and 1987 and has remained low. The British rate fell by over 8 percentage points between 1980 and 1988 and then rebounded in almost as dramatic a fashion, rising 5.6 percentage points in four years before levelling off. These trends, of course, are affected by many factors other than tax policy. For example, financial liberalisation appears to have been an important part of the saving decline in the 1980s in both countries, with Britain experiencing a dramatic rise in personal liabilities relative to personal income, even relative to the increase that occurred in the US. The run-up in equity values, social security reform, budget deficits and other factors may also have played important roles in saving trends.
Tax policy toward saving offers another potential source of the differential trends. The bulk of personal saving in both countries is directed toward assets with generous tax treatment (Banks and Blundell, 1994) . Private pensions and housing receive treatment more favourable than just not taxing the return on saving. Like the US, Britain has also experimented with a variety of other tax incentives for saving. These schemes -TESSAs, PEPs and PPPs, described below -provide an effective tax rate of zero on the return to saving.
Tax-Exempt Special Savings Accounts (TESSAs) were introduced in 1990. Any individual aged 18 or over was eligible to open a TESSA in an approved financial institution. Contributions could total £3,000 in the first year, and up to £1,800 in each of the next four years, subject to a total of £9,000 overall. Contributions were not deductible, but interest was entirely free of income tax if the principal was left in the account for five years. Withdrawal of the principal would trigger tax payments, but not penalties, so a TESSA, even under the worst circumstances, had at least as generous tax treatment as ordinary saving. The netof-tax interest could be withdrawn as it arose without losing the tax preference.
By 1992, there were 3.5 million TESSA accounts (out of about 22 million households in the UK). Thus about 15 per cent of households took out TESSAs, roughly equivalent to IRA take-up rates in the US after two years of universal eligibility.
It should be clear that TESSAs are very close substitutes for taxable interestbearing accounts. Notably, about 95 per cent of households with TESSAs also held other interest-bearing accounts. These households also tended to hold larger TESSA balances than others. Like IRAs, TESSAs tended to be held by wealthier, older households, which could more easily substitute existing funds into these accounts. Banks, Blundell and Dilnot (1994) present preliminary evidence consistent with the view that increases in TESSA balances were offset to a very large degree by reductions in other interest-bearing accounts. Given the revenue costs of TESSAs (from the forgone tax on interest), they conclude that TESSAs probably did not raise private saving much, if at all, and may well have reduced national saving.
Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) were introduced in 1986 and expanded in subsequent years. 13 Contributions are not deductible, but investments that are retained for one year, with reinvested dividends, are untaxed. The tax benefits of PEPs, however, were initially almost non-existent for small investors because of the high exemption on capital gains and because, as explained below, dividends were already effectively not taxed at the individual level, at least for taxpayers in the lowest tax bracket. Expansion of the contribution limits led to bigger take-up in subsequent years, but PEP ownership remains highest among older and highincome households. PEPs are likely to be very good substitutes for equity holdings for such households, and most PEP holders had other direct equity holdings. Banks, Blundell and Dilnot (1994) find evidence of significant substitution between PEPs and other equity holdings.
Britain has also moved toward replacing its unfunded public pension at the margin with a pre-funded private alternative; this may have contributed to an increase in the saving rate as well.
14 Britain has a three-tier pension system. The first tier (the basic benefit) is a state-supported minimum annuity payment that is financed out of progressive National Insurance contributions made by workers and employers. Basic benefits are about 15 per cent of average male earnings and are indexed to the price level, and so are expected to fall to 7-8 per cent by 2030. The third tier consists of conventional private pensions and other saving.
The second tier is more complex, consisting of a State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and private alternatives. In 1978, SERPS was introduced to provide a benefit of one-quarter of average wages in the highest 20 years of earnings, subject to earnings limits. Accrual formulas for SERPS entitlements were cut in 1986 and again in 1995. Combined with SERPS being indexed to retail prices rather than wages, these cuts suggest a large reduction in replacement ratios in the future.
Most workers, however, have exercised their option to contract out of SERPS, with 50 per cent of workers now in occupational pension schemes (employerprovided defined benefit plans) and an additional 28 per cent in private personal pension schemes (PPPs). When the personal pension option was initiated in 1988, workers were allowed to contract out to an individual account or employerprovided defined contribution plan. The government provided that workers who chose this option would have 5.8 percentage points of their National Insurance contributions redirected to the private pension. Also, an additional rebate of 2 per cent of covered earnings was offered for those who had not already contracted out. In addition, the rebate was grossed up to take account of the income tax relief on an individual's pension contributions -yielding a total contribution of 8.46 per cent of eligible earnings. Given the generosity of the programme and the large accompanying volume of advertising, the option turned out to be very popular.
15
Workers also have the option of contributing additional amounts to their personal pension. Total contribution limits are a function of salary and age and rise from 17.5 per cent of covered earnings for those aged 17 to 35, up to 40 per cent for those 61 and over.
It is unclear how these tax incentive plans have affected national saving. Estimates in Disney and Whitehouse (1992) indicate that, for about 80 per cent of workers, a government contribution of less than 8.46 per cent of salary would have been sufficient to induce them to contract out. This suggests that the option created substantial positive income effects that could have raised consumption and thereby reduced private saving.
About 60 per cent of workers with PPPs make no contribution to their PPP above the contracted-out rebate, incentive payment and income tax relief. For this group, current disposable income is the same as if they were still in SERPS, but their wealth is higher. This suggests that, if anything, they would increase their consumption. For the other 40 per cent, who do contribute beyond their National Insurance payment, some of the extra contribution may be new saving.
As an illustrative calculation, suppose that the 40 per cent of workers who contributed additional amounts contributed twice as much as the ones who only contributed their National Insurance contribution, and that all of such additional contributions were new saving. Then 2 / 7 of all contributions to PPPs would represent net additions to national saving. This seems to be an upper bound for the proportion of contributions that would be new saving (under the assumption that workers who contributed above their National Insurance contribution contributed double what other workers contributed). However, the additional contributions were tax-deductible and thus reduced public saving, all workers may have saved less in other forms because of the income effects of PPPs, and workers who contributed more than their National Insurance contribution may have financed part or all their additional contributions from existing assets or funds they would have saved anyway. Thus the net effect is unclear.
IV. THE VALUE ADDED TAX
The presence of a significant value added tax (VAT) is the single largest structural difference between the US and UK tax systems. Although the US imposes sales taxes at the state and local levels, these generate only about half as much revenue as VAT does in Britain.
The standard VAT rate is 17.5 per cent, with a rate of 5 per cent applied to domestic fuel. VAT systems provide special treatment of various goods and services in different ways. Zero-rated goods do not have net VAT levied on the final good or upon the inputs used in its creation. That is, the seller of a zero-rated good owes no VAT, but may claim credits for the VAT paid on inputs. Exempt goods do not have VAT levied on the final good sold to the consumer, but firms cannot reclaim the VAT paid on inputs, so they face effective VAT rates between zero and the standard rate, depending on the fraction of value added at the retail level. About 25 per cent of consumer expenditure in the UK is on zero-rated goods. These items include most food, new dwellings, passenger transport, books, newspapers and magazines, prescription medicine and children's clothing. About 15 per cent of consumer expenditure is exempt. This category includes rents, private education, health services, postal services, finance and insurance, and burial and cremation. Broadening the base of VAT has proven very difficult in recent years.
Perhaps the most notable feature of VAT, and certainly the least examined in the US, is the extent to which the provisions of VAT are dictated by international convention. European countries have jointly set certain parameters of the value added tax in a series of 'directives' over the last several decades. Prior to 1992, VAT rates were unrestricted by the directives. Currently, the standard VAT rate is not less than 15 per cent, but reduced rates can apply to certain targeted goods as noted above.
The elimination of border controls in 1993 -part of a larger European agenda which includes removing domestic preferences in public purchases, exchange controls and restrictions on inter-country mergers -causes additional problems for VAT and creates the possibility of fraudulent claims since VAT on exports is rebated.
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It is unclear how important the limited autonomy over VAT really is. To some extent, Conservative governments in the 1980s may have used the European dictates as externally imposed reasons to do what they wanted to do anywayraise the importance of VAT and reduce income tax. It is also unclear how important such problems might be for the US, were it to adopt a VAT. Presumably, one of the benefits of doing so would be the ability to co-ordinate with other countries, but a destination-based VAT would not be difficult to enforce internationally as long as the US did not maintain completely open borders.
The textbook view of the VAT is that it is simple, cheap to administer and selfenforcing. These attributes apply to the British VAT only with important qualifications, if at all. As noted above, the VAT base exempts or zero-rates a significant amount of consumption. Note also that most health care is provided publicly in Britain and is not subject to VAT. In applying the VAT in the US, there may be pressure to exempt or zero-rate health care. The VAT base, however, is narrower in Britain than in many other European countries, which raises hope that an American VAT could be relatively broad-based.
The UK employs a credit-invoice VAT -firms calculate their sales, calculate the VAT due on the sales and then take a tax credit for VAT that has been paid by others on the items the firm purchased. 17 In principle, an enforcement advantage of a credit-invoice VAT is the ability to match invoices from sellers and receipts of 16 The current set of proposals would change the parameters of VAT to conform with the absence of border controls. The specific components include: abolition of zero-rating exports in exchange for extending the VAT 'chain' to include cross-border transactions; uniform VAT rates and bases across countries; allocation of VAT revenues across European countries in relation to aggregate consumption rather than to derivation of revenues; establishing a single 'location' for each business; and cross-country co-operation and supervision of VAT administration. These provisions raise a host of concerns about tax administration, equity and incentives. See Smith (1997) . 17 Under the alternative approach -a subtraction-method VAT -firms add up their sales, subtract their purchases and pay VAT on the difference. Both methods give the same tax payments when all goods and services are included in the VAT and are taxed at the same rate. The credit-invoice method facilitates special treatment of different goods and services.
buyers. The basic idea is that, since the buyer of a good is going to report the transaction to the tax authorities in order to claim a VAT refund, the seller, knowing that the buyer will report, chooses also to report, so as not to be caught evading the tax. The paper trail also assists authorities in audits.
In practice, the British VAT authorities do not match invoices as an enforcement mechanism, due in part to the belief that doing so would generate only tiny gains in revenue and compliance. The authorities instead use other methods to estimate revenue, such as total sales and input purchases. This is obviously an indirect approach which relies on incomplete information and, if enforced aggressively, could lead to an intrusive and frequently incorrect tax authority insisting on inappropriate levels of tax payments.
One of the inevitable problems with taxing different goods at different rates is that there are no hard and fast definitions for particular good categories. One famous case involved Jaffa 'cakes'. The VAT authorities claimed that the product was a biscuit, while the Jaffa company claimed it was a cake, which would face a lower VAT rate.
18 Similar problems arise in the taxation of many other goods. Another problem is the taxation of services, where the absence of a physical inventory makes auditing and enforcement more difficult.
VAT can also be complex in other ways. For example, many small businesses are exempt from VAT. Thus the number of firms in the VAT system exceeds the number of firms paying VAT, because the former want to receive rebates on their purchases. In addition, businesses in the VAT system need to keep track not only of the value of their purchases but their composition as well.
Compliance and administrative costs average about 5 per cent of VAT revenues (Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989) . This is about half as high as estimates for the US income tax (Slemrod, 1996) but about the same as the income tax, capital gains tax and National Insurance scheme in the UK (Sandford et al., 1989) . Compliance costs are heavily weighted toward small firms that pay VAT, and are a very high proportion of VAT payments for such firms. One reason compliance costs are high is that VAT is not integrated with business income taxes for auditing and control purposes.
Evasion rates also appear to be fairly low -around 5 per cent -and evasion appears to be concentrated in a few sectors, notably small businesses that are just large enough to have to pay VAT but do not (Sandford et al., 1989) . One likely reason for higher evasion in this sector is the higher compliance costs. Another is that declaration of sales not only creates VAT liabilities, but also often creates income tax and National Insurance contribution liabilities for the business owner. Thus the effective return to evasion may be much higher for small businesses than that indicated by the VAT rate alone.
Although almost no one advocates that the US completely scrap the income tax and replace it with a VAT, many experts note the viability of reducing the size and scope of the income tax and replacing the lost revenue with a VAT (Slemrod and Bakija, 1996; Graetz, 1997) . The British experience with VAT, however, is probably not as satisfactory as one would hope for before signing on to a similar plan. In particular, a VAT that did not zero-rate or exempt so many goods, that was integrated with other business taxes in administration and that handled exports more effectively would represent a better model for the US to build on.
V. CORPORATE INCOME TAX
The corporate income tax is levied against the profits of UK resident companies, public corporations and unincorporated associations. Deductions are allowed for interest payments, a limited amount of research and development expenditures, wages and pension contributions. Depreciation deductions vary by assets. For equipment and machinery, 25 per cent of the unused basis may be deducted in each year. Hotels and industrial buildings may be deducted at a 4 per cent straightline rate. Unused depreciation deductions and losses may be carried back for three years and carried forward indefinitely.
In 1996-97, taxable income faced a marginal tax rate of 24 per cent on the first £300,000 of profit and of 35.25 per cent on profits between £300,000 and £1.5 million. Both the average and the marginal tax rates were 33 per cent on profits above £1.5 million.
The British corporate tax is partially integrated with the individual income tax. When a company pays a dividend, it pays an additional 25 per cent of the amount in 'advance corporation tax' (ACT). For tax purposes, shareholders are deemed to have received both the dividend and the tax payment and to have remitted payments in the amount of the ACT to the Inland Revenue. The tax payment is also credited against the corporation's income tax. The net effect is that, for dividends paid to certain taxpayers, there is no change in net tax revenues.
For example, consider a firm that pays £100 in dividends. Under current law, it is required to send a cheque to the Inland Revenue for an additional £25, as the ACT. (This is considered a 20 per cent ACT rate, because £25 is 20 per cent of the 'grossed-up dividend' of £100+£25.) The firm credits this payment against its corporate income tax, so that the dividend does not change the firm's total tax payments. (The ACT can be carried back six years and forward indefinitely.)
The shareholder receives dividends of £100, and is deemed to have received £125 in income and to have paid £25 in taxes. Thus if the investor is in the 20 per cent tax bracket, there are no further tax consequences. The deemed £25 in tax payments exactly offsets the deemed £125 in income, so that the dividend does not change tax payments for the shareholder. However, a shareholder in the 24 per cent bracket would owe an additional £5, and a shareholder in the 40 per cent bracket would owe an additional £25.
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The ACT credit is a major feature of corporate taxation. In 1995-96, corporation tax raised £24.7 billion. By way of comparison, ACT totalled £9.9 billion -40 per cent of corporate tax revenue and 3.6 per cent of all tax revenue.
Historically, pension funds, which are tax-exempt, could receive refundable ACT credits on their dividend receipts. Because dividends paid to taxpayers in the 20 per cent tax bracket have no net revenue consequences, credits given to pension funds reduce overall tax revenue. That is, if the dividend had not been paid, tax revenue would have been higher. Thus the payment to pension funds represents not just a tax exemption, but a partial refund of corporate taxes.
The extent of integration has declined in recent years. The Conservative government cut the ACT rate from 25 per cent to its current 20 per cent in 1993. The new Labour government proposed in July 1997 to eliminate ACT refunds for pension funds immediately and for other zero-rate taxpayers in 1999. Another Labour proposal would reduce the rate of tax credit to 10 per cent starting in 1999. At the same time, Labour has proposed reducing the top corporate tax rate to 31 per cent from 33 per cent.
The stated intent of these changes is to encourage investment by reducing the tax rate on corporate profits and encouraging retained earnings. But while raising the tax on dividends might encourage firms to reinvest earnings, it would also raise the overall taxation on corporate earnings. It is thus not obvious that the proposed policy would encourage investment in the long run.
Caution is required in translating these patterns into lessons for the US. Partial corporate integration is feasible and suggesting it does not appear to have created a political firestorm, but it could be quite expensive. The effects of partial integration on corporate investment and dividend policy in Britain are of particular interest, but are difficult issues. Since 1985, both investment and the ratio of dividend payments to GDP have soared in Britain relative to the US. It is not obvious that such trends are largely attributable to tax policy, though.
VI. THE POLL TAX 20
The British experience with the community charge, or poll tax, is a fascinating chapter in recent tax history. Before the poll tax, local government in Britain was financed by a combination of grants from central government and local business and residential property taxes. The latter are referred to as 'the rates' because the tax liability was determined by multiplying the notional rental value by a tax rate 19 The shareholder in the 24 per cent bracket would owe total taxes of £30 (=0.24×125), but would have been deemed to have paid £25 already. The shareholder in the 40 per cent bracket would owe total taxes of £50 (=0.40×125), but would have been deemed to have paid £25 already. 20 Smith (1991) and Besley, Preston and Ridge (1997) provide detailed and informative studies of the poll tax.
set annually by the local authorities. The central government grants were often called block grants, but had important matching elements.
This system of local finance was criticised on several grounds, some seemingly more reasonable than others. Rental values were not always adjusted appropriately. Because of the matching elements of central government grants, local governments and their residents did not bear the full marginal costs of decisions to raise local spending. Property taxes varied substantially across localities, which, according to Smith (1991) , gave rise to apparent inequities across regions. Finally, because only the head of household was legally liable for property tax, there appears to have been a (mistaken) notion that very few people had to bear the burden of local property taxes, making the general public less accountable for the costs of local decisions and placing unfair burdens on those who paid property tax.
The Thatcher government wanted, in general, to introduce more local accountability for local spending and, in particular, to reduce the level and improve the efficiency of local spending. This was to be accomplished, across localities, by requiring each locality as a whole to internalise the entire cost of its marginal increases in expenditures and, within localities, by requiring the increased costs to be spread over all voters.
Toward this end, a new system of local finance was implemented in Scotland in 1989 and in England and Wales in 1990. The business property tax was altered: business property was revalued, and rates were to be set by the national, rather than local, government. The residential property tax was abolished and replaced with a community charge, an equal tax on each adult in a locality. There were a limited number of exemptions, and there were rebates of up to 80 per cent for the poorest individuals. The central government grant was set so that, if a locality spent funds at its assessed needs level, the local community charge would equal a national standard level. Each pound by which local spending exceeded its assessed needs had to be financed from the poll tax. The poll tax was intended to represent about one-quarter of local government revenues. Thus raising local spending above the assessed needs level by, say, 15 per cent would require a 60 per cent increase in the local community charge.
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Both the conceptual basis and the implementation of the poll tax were severely lacking. On the implementation side, central government gave little thought to enforceability, transition or intergovernmental issues. Unlike property, residents are mobile. Annual population turnover rates were as high as 36 per cent in some rural areas and up to 55 per cent in inner London. This made it quite difficult to ensure that people registered for the tax. Local governments recognised the compliance problems immediately and opposed the legislation on those grounds. Smith (1991) notes that, in response to their opposition to the tax, local governments may have set the tax higher than it needed to be. That is, they may have used the change in regimes as a way to increase their own spending, gambling that the concomitant increase in taxes would be blamed on the central government and would increase the unpopularity of the tax. Recall that even small increases in local spending would generate large percentage increases in the required poll tax. The average poll tax ended up being 30 per cent higher than predicted and more than double what was proposed in 1987.
The tax change redistributed resources across regions and across families within regions. The major regional 'winners' were areas with high property values in south-east England, an area with strong Conservative support. Within regions, multi-adult households lost relative to single-adult households. In response to the losses created by redistribution, the national government set up a safety net of compensating payments from 'winning' regions to 'losing' regions, to be phased out over several years. This system proved inadequate in several dimensions. It raised costs and reduced support for the poll tax in the 'winning' regions, it did nothing to address within-region redistribution across families and it only redistributed local burdens -it did not reduce the overall local burden, on average.
On the conceptual side, the tax change replaced a set of taxes based loosely on ability to pay with one based loosely on the benefit principle. Smith (1991) , however, argues that a poll tax is an inappropriate application even of the benefit principle. While it is certainly true that not all taxes need to be progressive to make the overall tax system progressive, it seems clear that voters rejected the idea that, for example, Buckingham Palace staff should have to remit more in community charges than royalty themselves.
Moreover, while the poll tax clearly raised the local marginal costs of increasing expenditures, Smith (1991) argues further that it may have done little to improve accountability, since voting mechanisms in general are not efficient and local choices in particular were often constrained by national parties. Thus localities received the burden of higher marginal costs without much in the way of increased autonomy.
For all of these reasons, the poll tax came to be regarded as extraordinarily unfair and ultimately unmanageable. Non-payment campaigns developed and estimated non-payment rates reached 50 per cent in some areas. A Member of Parliament was arrested for not paying the tax. More than 20 per cent of taxpayers required a summons before paying the poll tax, seven times higher than the proportion requiring a summons under the old property tax. Non-compliance was not due primarily to unfamiliarity with the tax, since non-compliance rates rose over time (Besley, Preston and Ridge, 1997) . The administrative costs of local taxes tripled in the first year of the poll tax. Disapproval rates reached 90 per cent.
In the second year, the central government provided some overall transition relief in the form of reducing the burden of the poll tax, but the die had been cast. The poll tax was abandoned shortly thereafter, by the Conservative Party that proposed it in the first place, on the grounds that it was uncollectable.
The new council tax, initiated in 1993, is a function of property value and the number of adults in the household and raised about 20 per cent of local revenue in 1995-96. Properties are placed in certain bands based on their value in April 1991. The rate structure applied to the bands is determined by the national government, 22 but the rate levels are determined by local government. This system allows the national government to control the progressivity of the tax burden, but lets the local government determine the overall level of the tax burden (and spending).
There is obviously much to learn from these events. Smith (1991) lists some appropriate conclusions: the importance of administrability and equity in determining whether a tax can remain in place, and the need for transition relief if significant tax restructurings are to be politically palatable. Besley, Preston and Ridge (1997) note emerging compliance problems in the council tax, and suggest that this may be an effect of the poll tax. Hence the longer-run effects on compliance may also be important. They also note that compliance can present problems even in countries with a well-developed tax and monitoring system.
One odd aspect of the entire episode, from an American perspective, is the extent to which central government can dictate local tax policy. This raises obvious issues of autonomy as well as principal-agent problems. The central government wanted to change the behaviour of local governments in a way that the locals resisted. To accomplish this goal, the central government needed and expected the co-operation of local governments. There is some evidence to suggest that such co-operation did not occur. The agency problems that arise when one government is expected to enforce another government's taxes is a little-explored area of public finance. The issue relates directly, however, to proposals that would establish a national retail sales tax in the US to be collected by the states.
A final set of observations falls under the general category 'an old tax is a good tax'. The property tax clearly suffered from technical complexities in determining rental values and political difficulties in adjusting values. But Besley, Preston and Ridge (1997) describe the property tax as a 600-year-old system that faced little non-compliance and was based, at least loosely, on ability to pay. Smith (1991) notes that the property tax was easy to administer. This is not to say that all taxes should stay the way they are, just that major changes in taxes should take careful account of the costs and benefits of the existing and new systems, as well as of the transition costs of establishing the new system. Moreover, the fairness, or perceived fairness, of new taxes that are quite different from the ones they replace 22 For example, property in one band is assigned a rate of 1 while properties in other bands are assigned rates ranging from 2 /3 to 2.
appears to be an important constraint on policy options. In short, the poll tax episode is, among other things, a case in point about the dangers of overselling the theoretical and empirical advantages of tax reform and about ignoring fairness, transition and administrative considerations in developing new tax proposals.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The British and American tax systems have much in common, several important differences and experiences, and much to learn from each other. One major theme is that the structure and administration of the British income tax are much simpler than those of its American counterpart. It seems quite plausible that differences in administrative arrangements led to important differences in the structure of income taxes in the two countries. This could have happened directly, in that some tax subsidies are simply too difficult to handle in a no-return system. Or it could have happened indirectly, in the sense that when people do not file tax returns very often, they do not immediately look to the tax code as the natural way to subsidise various activities.
In any case, the British example shows that the US income tax could be much simpler if Americans were willing to reduce the extent to which the income tax attempted to tax all income or tried to administer social policy through the tax code. A larger issue, unexamined here, is whether the resulting tax-transfer system would end up being more efficient and equitable.
A second major difference is the importance of consumption taxes in the UK relative to the US. The experience of Britain and other countries shows that a VAT could be established in the US to replace a substantial component of income tax revenues, but that VATs are neither as simple, nor as much of an elixir for growth, as is sometimes claimed. Also, the willingness of the population to accept VAT, in the UK and in other countries, may be conditioned heavily on social spending programmes that are more generous than those found in the US.
It would be of great interest to pursue the behavioural effects of these differences in tax policy: that is, do taxes matter? Detailed investigations along these lines are beyond the scope of this paper, but it is interesting to note that, despite the virtual elimination of mortgage interest subsidies and of capital gains taxes, Britain is neither suffering from a collapse in housing nor benefiting from an extraordinary boom in investment and entrepreneurship. As these are two of the most controversial sets of issues in America, further investigation is clearly warranted.
It would also be interesting to pursue further the role of differing political systems and institutions in the conduct of tax policy (see also Keen (1997) ). The party in control in the British parliamentary system often has much more power than the majority party in the US Congress. Thus one might imagine that parties with such extensive authority could push through tax breaks for whatever favoured constituency they chose. Yet the British system seems, at least at a distance, to be remarkably devoid of such loopholes, at least relative to the American system. Why that is the case would be an interesting further 'lesson' for America. One possibility is the differing role of campaign contributions in the two countries (Keen, 1997; Graetz, 1997) .
Recent changes in the income tax and the corporate tax suggest that Britain may be moving in the direction of the American tax system in certain ways. It is difficult to know what to make of this development. It seems unlikely to be due to any inherent superiority of the American approach to taxation. Rather, the change may be best interpreted as part of the cyclical variation one would naturally expect as taxpayers and political leaders continue to make trade-offs between policies that support the conflicting goals of equity, efficiency, simplicity and revenue requirements.
